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ABSTRACT
Religion has influenced Ugandan politics ever since colonial times.
While the interrelations of religion and politics have altered since
the coming to power of president Museveni’s National Resistance
Movement (NRM), religion continues to influence Ugandan public
culture and formal politics in important ways. Building on
ethnographic fieldwork in Kampala and Acholi, as well as analysis
of media reporting and discussions in social media, this article
focuses on the role of religious leaders during Uganda’s 2016
parliamentary and presidential elections. We argue that the
striking differences between Ugandan clerics’ teaching on politics
relate in part to genuine differences in religious beliefs, but also
to patronage, intimidation, and ethnicity, and to the strategic
calculations religious leaders make about how best to affect
change in a constricted political environment. In discussion with
previous research on religion and politics in Africa, and utilising
analytical concepts from the study of publics, the article proposes
a model of religious (de)politicisation, whereby both the
politicising and depoliticising effects of religion are
acknowledged. To do so, the analysis distinguishes between NGO-
ised and enchanted planes of religion, and shows that on both
planes, religion contributed simultaneously to enhancing and
diminishing the space for public debate in election-time Uganda.
While many religious leaders actively or silently supported the
incumbent regime, religious leaders also took vocal public stands,
fostered political action, and catered for vernacular imaginaries of
political critique, by so doing expanding the space of public
debate. However, by performing public debate that remained
vague on crucial issues, and by promoting a religious narrative of
peace, religious leaders participated in the enactment of a façade
of political debate, in so doing legitimising the autocratic facets of
Museveni’s hybrid regime. Acknowledging religion as an
important constituent of public culture contributes to more
nuanced understandings of election dynamics in Eastern Africa.
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‘No political rally will ever gather the crowds you see gathered in Ugandan churches every
Sunday morning.’ This statement, made by the Secretary General of the Uganda Joint
Christian Council in response to our question about the role of religion in Uganda’s
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elections, reflects the highly religious character of public culture in Uganda. Combined, the
crowds who gather to pray, praise, and listen to sermons in churches and mosques across
the country, far outnumber those attracted by pre-election political spectacles.1 In this
article, we argue that what religious leaders say and do within these religious spaces
and in public debate in Uganda is of consequence for the country’s politics: religion
serves both to enhance, and to diminish Uganda’s ‘political proper’.
Our key contention is that as a whole, despite the attempts of many religious leaders
towards the opposite, public religion served to depoliticise the elections – that is, to
weaken the political proper – what Cochrane describes as the ‘space of the public, in
which the communicative interaction necessary to subdue and tame the destructive
excesses of political power… becomes possible’.2 To make this argument, we utilise Gif-
ford’s distinction between the plane of ‘NGO-ised’ religion, which has in recent years
increasingly adopted the language and forms of secular donor-funded civil society, and
that of ‘enchanted’ religion, which embraces belief in the power of other-worldly forces
to influence this-worldly affairs.3 While we argue that depoliticisation took place on
both of these levels, we also identify divergent impacts: both as staff of NGOs, and as
leaders of communities of enchanted religious imagination, Ugandan religious leaders
took vocal public stands, and catered for vernacular imaginaries of political critique, by
so doing expanding the political proper in election-time Uganda.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, as examples of religious activity on the NGO-
ised plane, we analyse the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda’s (IRCU) role in arranging
televised presidential debates prior to the elections, and the election monitoring activities
of the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC). We claim that while the declared aim of
these activities was to entrench democracy, they may in fact have served to entrench
the authoritarian side of Museveni’s hybrid regime. Second, in discussing enchanted reli-
gion, we observe how religious leaders’ interpretations and teaching about the source of
authority could be employed during election time both to legitimise and to delegitimise
political power on the one hand, and popular protest on the other. Similarly, idioms of
spiritual or divine influence, and of spiritual warfare can be interpreted both as depoliti-
cising, and as forms of vernacular political critique.
Third, we discuss the considerable diversity in individual religious leaders’ positions on
the elections. We argue that while this diversity can in part be understood in light of
genuine differences in formal doctrine and personal religious convictions, the likelihood
of religious leaders to lend support to the ruling regime is importantly moulded by the
position of religious leaders in networks of patronage, their vulnerability to state intimida-
tion, and by ethnicity. All of these issues not only pit religious groups against each other,
but also feed division within groups, thus weakening their ability and willingness to work
as counterweights to state power.
The starting point for our analysis is deliberately normative, in that we consider public
debate, and the possibility for citizens to participate in it without fear of violence or dis-
crimination, a desirable feature of any society. This position, and the analysis presented in
this article, are informed by our long-term engagement with analysing Ugandan politics as
researchers, and in Ssentongo’s case also as a regular political commentator, as well as by
previous ethnographic research we have conducted in Kibaale4 and Kitgum.5 The empiri-
cal material for this article was gathered during fieldwork conducted around the time of
the elections in Kampala and the Acholi subregion. During this time, we observed the



































main service in two Pentecostal, one Catholic, and one Protestant church and in two
mosques, in addition to which research assistants took observation notes from 10
places of worship in one Acholi town on the Sunday prior to elections. Alongside numer-
ous informal discussions with Ugandans from different backgrounds, we conducted
formal interviews with representatives of the IRCU and UJCC in Kampala; with close
to 20 Catholic, Protestant, Pentecostal-Charismatic and Muslim clerics and lay church
leaders in Acholi; and with civil society activists in both locations. In addition, we analysed
materials produced by the UJCC and IRCU, as well as articles and debates on religious
involvement in the elections in local radio, print as well as social media. Due to the
safety concerns of some of our informants, their names, and details of dates and locations
of interviews are withheld.
Religion, politics and (de)politicisation in Africa
Scholars on African religion and politics increasingly agree that the two are entangled, and
that to understand their significance in African societies, it is necessary to abandon
assumptions of the inevitability of the continent’s secularisation and democratisation fol-
lowing a ‘Western’model. Beyond this consensus there is, however, considerable variation
in focus and analytical approach. Research focusing on the state has often looked at the
institutionalised relationships of religious elites and the state6, or the impact of religion
on people’s interest in formal politics7 or electoral behaviour.8 A recurring interest in
this research has been the effect of religion on democratisation. Since the 1980s, when
mainline churches played key roles in the third wave of democratisation in Africa,
churches on the continent have been far less visible for promoting democracy than they
have for promoting conservative morality laws.9 A number of the reasons behind this
shift have relevance for our analysis. First, the opening of political space enabled the emer-
sion of new civil society actors alongside churches, which under totalitarian rule had often
been the only ones strong enough to express public discontent (ibid). Second, as Kassimir
argues, the transition from one-party dictatorships to multiparty democracies found
churches somewhat lost as to what to lobby for next, whereby internal ethnic divisions
and patronage ties lessened the likelihood that they would oppose the state.10 Third,
through their increased engagement in service provision, religious institutions have
been increasingly drawn into networks of neoliberal governmentality, decreasing their
credibility in the eyes of many of their members,11 and intensifying their tendency to repli-
cate patterns of the authoritarian governance found in state institutions.12
Parallel to debates about the impact of religion on formal democratisation, and in part
triggered by the phenomenal growth of Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity in Africa,
more culturally oriented scholarship has highlighted the importance of religious
healing, ritual, community and belief in the lifeworlds of millions of Africans. Seeking
to de-stabilise the dichotomies of state–society, public–private, and secular–profane,
this research has pushed analysis to explore the political nature of religion in itself.13 At
an early point in this debate, Schoffeleers argued that to read politics into apparently apo-
litical religious expression risks blinding scholars to how symbolic protest in fact ‘function
[s] so as to discourage rather than encourage active involvement in critical politics’.14 In
response, Bompani prompted scholars to move ‘beyond seeing politics exclusively in terms
of direct opposition to or support for government policies and institutions’.15 Thus seen, it



































could be acknowledged that members of churches can be politically active in spite of the
apparently apolitical sermons they hear on Sunday mornings. Bompani’s point has par-
ticular relevance in settings characterised by political repression and volatile divisions,
such as Apartheid-era South Africa, and, we argue, contemporary Uganda. In such con-
texts, for religious leaders to take openly political stands may be ill-advised, not only
because of the personal political risks incurred, but because their members fall in opposing
political camps.16
To draw from literature on the entanglements of religion and both formal and informal
politics, we employ Gifford’s recent distinction between NGO-ised and enchanted reli-
gion.17Aswe show, followingEllis and terHaar18, these do not constitutemutually exclusive
categories, but rather, exist as parallel and often entangled planes in Ugandan religiosity.
Echoing Cochrane, we ask whether, how, and to what extent these two planes of religion
can be seen as having provided a ‘source of vitality for recovering “the political proper”’.19
Despite utilising concepts that have a decidedly Habermasian ring, we reject the Haber-
masian view that insists on ‘a singular public sphere regulated by a narrowly circumscribed
form of rational argumentation’.20 Rather, for us the ideal political proper implies a space
of debate by multiple voices, employing multiple rationalities and languages; what Gardi-
ner (ibid.) has called a ‘wild public’. By acknowledging religion as an integral part of such
publics, ‘embodied, deeply felt experiences can be represented as coexisting with instances
of deliberative and critical reason’.21
Religion and politics in Uganda: a multi-faced entanglement
The intricate entanglement of politics and religion in contemporary Uganda has its roots
in the late nineteenth-century Buganda kingdom. ArabMuslims, who were the first to gain
influence in the court, were followed in 1877 by the British (Anglican) Church Missionary
Society, and two years later the French Roman Catholic White Fathers.22 After decades of
religious rivalry, the 1900 Buganda Agreement established a tradition whereby Protestants
received the largest, Catholics a moderate, and Muslims a circumscribed share of political
power. As the Uganda protectorate expanded to include territories beyond Buganda, this
pattern of political alignment was transplanted into new territories23, and has remained
resilient in Ugandan politics to date.
In preparation for Uganda’s independence, both the Catholic and the Protestant church
lobbied the colonial state and emerging Ugandan political elites to adopt their views on
how best to arrange church-state relations in the fledgling nation24. By the time of inde-
pendence in 1962, the newly founded Democratic Party (DP) was popularly known as
Diini ya Papa (religion of the Pope), and the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) as the
United Protestants of Canterbury. Religious rivalries have, however always been cut
across by ethnic and regional divisions. For instance, although the DP was largely a Catho-
lic initiative, it was also strongly identified with Baganda interests, while the Protestant
UPC was dominated by Northern Ugandan politicians.
Independent Uganda’s presidents have adopted various means to secure the favour of
religious leaders while preventing them from exerting control on the state: Milton Obote
nationalised church-founded schools, and Idi Amin handed out cars and cash to buy reli-
gious leaders’ favour while silencing the most critical among them. In 1986, the coming to
power of Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army/Movement, which identified



































politicised ethnic and religious divisions as one of Uganda’s key problems, led to notable
changes in Uganda’s religious field. Dismantling of multiparty politics weakened the old
church-affiliated parties, while increased religious freedom led to a proliferation of Pente-
costal-Charismatic churches. Under the NRM, those clerics who have not openly opposed
the government have found it relatively easy to operate without intervention or restraint,
and those with large followings have also attracted state funding and presidential visits.
Religious leaders critical of the government, however, have often been dealt with decisively.
During the northern Ugandan war, clergy who spoke out about the government’s mistreat-
ment of Acholi civilians were imprisoned, harassed, and some missionaries also deported.
Recently, critical political statements by clerics have triggered reminders that religion
should not interfere with politics, while, somewhat paradoxically, religious leaders inclined
towards the NRM have been appointed by the President to political positions.
In recent years, Museveni’s critique of religion as a divisive factor has been increasingly
coupled with his praise of religion as a benign collaborator. For instance, in a speech he
gave at the born-again all-night New Year’s prayers two months prior to the 2016 elec-
tions, Museveni declared that in coming years, religious groups would receive increased
state funding, ‘because they have helped the state to police the minds of its people
instead of just depending on policing of the body’.25 The fact that the statement was
made at a born-again event was no mere coincidence. Ugandan religious and political
argumentation has in recent years become increasingly pentecostalised, as seen for
instance during debates about ‘anti-gay’ legislation.26 Although the division between the
Catholics and the Protestants continues to have some degree of resonance, religious affilia-
tion in contemporary Uganda does not translate directly into either a pro- or anti-govern-
ment position. The NRM thus has to curry favour from religious leaders across a broad
religious spectrum.
NGO-ised religious actors in the 2016 elections
In the week prior to the 2016 elections, bishops seemed to be everywhere. We met one in a
bank for instance, speaking from the television pinned to the corner of the room to an
attentive crowd of some 30 people on behalf of the Uganda Joint Christian Council
(UJCC). The bishop’s message – that it was important to vote, to vote wisely, to stay
calm, and to pray for peace – was repeated in the pre-election weeks on TV screens,
front pages of newspapers, on radio stations, and in churches and mosques, across the
country. We argue that this lobbying, particularly its most prominent forms; the arranging
of the presidential debates, and the UJCC’s election monitoring activities; both politicised
the elections by expanding the space for public debate, and depoliticised the elections by
shutting down debate through an over-emphasis on peace, similar to what was witnessed
in Kenya’s 2013 elections.27
While the pamphlets and statements of both the UJCC and the Inter-Religious Council
of Uganda (IRCU) are peppered with statements which refer to the divine mission of reli-
gious communities, the bulk of the language used by these organisations in their state-
ments, and by their staff in our interviews, echoes rather standard discourse of ‘secular’
donor-funded civil society actors. The two umbrella bodies thus provide prime examples
of NGO-ised religion. The UJCC, founded in 1964, has three member churches: the
Catholic, the Protestant and Uganda’s small Orthodox Church. In addition to these, the



































IRCU, formed in 2001, includes the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council, the Seventh Day
Adventists and two different federations of Pentecostal churches. During the first decades
of the UJCC’s existence, the conflictual relationship between Catholics and Protestants, as
well as extensive political repression, rendered the umbrella body rather ineffectual.28 In
recent years, spurred on by the waning of church-affiliated political parties under the
NRM regime, and the drastic growth in donor funding for ‘faith-based’ development in
the 1980s and 1990s, both organisations have, however, gained in prominence. Two
issues in particular have drawn their attention: ‘morality laws’, including the ‘anti-gay
bill’, and good governance and democracy. The turning point for the latter form of acti-
vism was 1994, when the UJCC gathered over half a million US dollars from donors to
conduct election observation and civic education around the elections for the re-introduc-
tion of political parties (ibid.) The organisations’ outspoken support for the anti-gay legis-
lation can be seen as another kind of turning point: in 2014, USAID withdrew a grant
which had covered 90% of the IRCU’s funds, leading to the entire IRCU staff being laid
off. The UJCC also came to the 2016 election monitoring mission with considerably
fewer funds than previously.
In the previous two elections (2006, 2011), UJCC conducted election monitoring
together with a consortium of civil society actors under the Democracy Monitoring
Group (DEMGROUP), but in 2016 the UJCC stood alone. According to UJCC’s Secretary
General, Father Sylvester Arinaitwe, the Council felt the joint coalition had adopted an
overly partisan, pro-opposition attitude, for which reason it was better for churches to dis-
tance themselves so as to develop their ‘own unique voice’. Both the UJCC and the IRCU
systematically foster a non-partisan image. For instance, the retired Bishop Zac Niringiye
of the Church of Uganda was advised to leave his chair in UJCC when he became actively
involved in social justice activism. But there is also resistance to explicitly pro-government
stances: the UJCC has declined Pentecostal churches membership due to their being too
openly partisan and having few structures for internal control.
The two bodies’ precarious balancing act, between being non-partisan and being com-
pletely noncommittal, was played out in a curious way after the 2016 elections. In a press
release one week after the elections, the UJCC drew on their election monitors’ reports to
level critiques very similar to those made by the EU election observers,29 concerning for
instance the belated opening of polling stations; missing ballots; and the declaration of
results without tallying in certain constituencies.30 The UJCC also raised concerns over
Kizza Besigye’s detainment, arguing that it ‘constitute[d] impunity on the part of the
State’. Furthermore, they argued that the harsh security measures had ‘robbed the presi-
dential election… of a level playing field, its key elements being freedom of movement, of
assembly, of expression and the right to equal protection of the law’.31
While the UJCC’s preliminary statements (curiously, no final report has to date been
published) retain a modicum of critical edge, some of the statements made by the
IRCU and UJCC after the elections bring to mind Gifford’s claim concerning Catholic pas-
toral letters, which often operate on ‘a level of generality… that make them almost eva-
sions’.32 What further nullified the impact of critique by the UJCC or IRCU were
statements made by individual religious leaders. Notably, the Archbishop Stanley
Ntagali, who sits on the Council of Presidents of the IRCU and is Chairperson of the
UJCC, congratulated Museveni over his victory already before the petition challenging
the elections in the Supreme Court was disposed of. Once the petition was dismissed,



































Ntagali stated that this proved that Museveni was indeed ‘lawfully elected and is a leader
chosen by the Almighty God’.33 An image circulating on social media soon after Ntagali’s
statement contained two pictures of the bishop; one with his mouth open, with the caption
‘When asked to comment on gay issues’ and another with his mouth tightly shut, with the
text ‘When asked about oppression and election fraud issues.’
While many of both the clergy and non-clergy that we spoke with felt it was important
for clergy to remain polite towards political leaders and to remain non-partisan in their
statements, many also expressed frustration over the vagueness of clergy’s position.
Some Protestant, Catholic and Islamic clergy, drawing on joint discomfort with the com-
promised silence and vagueness of the IRCU and UJCC, have launched an independent
pressure group, Religious Leaders United for Peace and Justice, under the leadership of
the retired Bishop Zac Niringiye. While the group sees itself as playing the true prophetic
role beholden of religious leaders, the UJCC and IRCU have distanced themselves from it,
blaming it for partisan activism.
Both the IRCU and the UJCC mostly operate at the national level, through press state-
ments and direct dialogues with law- and policy-makers in Kampala. On paper, both
organisations have regional bodies, but these have no paid staff and very little if any
funding. Members of the local body of the IRCU for Acholi subregion for instance told
us that the committee had never sat for a meeting. IRCU staff from Kampala came to
hold election training for religious leaders from the greater North, so as to enable them
to train others. No such ‘trickle-down’ trainings had, however, been held. Similarly, the
UJCC’s election observation was theoretically implemented by subregional Ecumenical
Joint Action Committees (EJAC). A week before the elections, representatives of UJCC
member churches in Gulu told us that the local EJAC was ‘in the process’ of identifying
election observers for the district; whereas in Kitgum, no information or guidance from
either the IRCU or UJCC reached local clergy. There were, however, individual initiatives
at a local level. For instance, Pentecostal pastors in Kitgum hosted a radio debate for local
candidates, and gathered religious leaders from different churches for a call-in show focus-
ing on voter education, and for daily prayers for peace in the week prior to the election. It
would appear that at a local level, local initiatives may have been far more significant than
national-level networks, the impact of which reaches grassroots clergy largely in the same
way it does other Ugandans: through national media.34
On January 8th and February 12th of 2016, the IRCU, together with the Elders Forum
of Uganda, arranged the first ever televised presidential debates in Uganda so as to
‘provide a balanced space for all the presidential candidates to sell their agenda to all
the Ugandans and to make a commitment to peaceful and violence-free 2016 general elec-
tions’.35 The debate was applauded in Ugandan media and public discussions as a vital
step in the country’s democratisation process. But the significance of the debates
appears also to have been somewhat ironical, as was inadvertently expressed in an
article published by the government-owned New Vision, which declared that ‘[h]osting
the debate… portrayed the country as democratic’.36
Considering the violence witnessed in some parts of the country around the elections,
the securitisation and monetisation of the campaigns, and Besigye’s extended house arrest,
one can ask whether this portrayal of democracy was reflective of reality. At least the
crowd gathered to watch the second debate at a bar in Kitgum broke out in incredulous
laughter when the presidential candidates joined hands in prayer. This was a powerful



































symbol of what religious leaders wanted to push for during the pre-election period: peace
and unity. But at what cost? As Smith has written ‘peace is itself a fraught concept that
often conceals the violence upon which apparent peace depends’.37 So also we contend
that the peace narrative of Uganda’s religious leaders underemphasised the violence
that undergirds Uganda’s contemporary ‘peace’.
Whereas many of the official documents of the two organisations emphasise peace and
justice, the majority of media messages and, from the evidence we gathered, homilies in
churches and mosques, prioritised peace over justice. Clerics’ calls for peace blended
well with the state’s heavy deployment of security forces during and after elections in
the name of ensuring peace. The state’s silencing of legitimate political resistance thus
benefited from the peace narrative cultivated by religious leaders. When we raised this
argument in interviews, many religious leaders responded by highlighting that peace
was a priority, because its alternatives were worse. As understandable as this position
was, we argue that considering how only a few years earlier, prominent religious leaders
had vocally opposed the amendment of term limits38, the extent to which peace
trumped all other concerns in 2016 is striking. It seems that once it became clear that
Museveni was not going to step down, a considerable part of Ugandan religious leaders
opted to focus on either securing their own positions, or on fending off the chaos many
people feared would erupt if Museveni lost the vote.
To elucidate this point, it is worth looking at how, in order to convince Museveni to
come for the second presidential debate, the organisers had to agree that their most
sharp-tongued moderator would not pose him any questions. An IRCU representative
we interviewed defended this concession as ‘part of the “give and take” meant to make
everyone feel comfortable’. The statement is, we suggest, indicative of a more general
characteristic of the relations between religious leaders and the state in Uganda. In
order to succeed in engaging the president in discussion, religious leaders must ensure
they do not make him uncomfortable. Hence, just as the most outspoken of the modera-
tors was silenced by IRCU, so religious leaders generally silence themselves. This is the
‘give and take’ of Uganda’s hybrid regime: to enable continued engagement with the
state, public figures must refrain from saying things the state does not wish to hear.
(De)politicisation through enchanted religion
The religious leaders we interviewed were on a whole highly adept at using NGO-ised
language about the elections. But what was notable was the fluidity with which many of
them shifted register, from NGO-ised to enchanted language, as soon as we asked
whether God, the Devil, or spirits had anything to do with the issues we were discussing.
Stories of politicians going underwater, of committing sacrifices, and of visiting traditional
healers and diviners in order to gain power, are a powerful currency in political debate – in
Uganda, as elsewhere in Africa.39 As Ellis and ter Haar have argued, in many African epis-
temologies of power, the material and the immaterial ‘cannot be separated, although they
can be distinguished from each other’.40 Indeed, as the clerics showed with their shift from
one register of language to another, the enchanted and NGO-ised planes of religion – and
of religious actors’ political engagements – exist comfortably alongside each other in
Ugandan public culture. In this section of the article, we argue that engagements with poli-
tics on an enchanted level can both expand and diminish the space for public debate. To



































make this claim, we first analyse Ugandan religious leaders’ political theologies pertaining
to authority, and then discuss the ways in which a spirit idiom was employed to political
analysis in election-time Uganda.
Two distinct strands appear in the political theologies employed by religious leaders in
relation to politics and the elections. The first of these emphasises the divine origin of pol-
itical authority, an argument put to us by both PCC, Protestant, Catholic and Muslim
clergy. One example of this was presented in a WhatsApp message distributed by a Catho-
lic priest to a group to which one of the authors belonged, in which he urged Ugandans not
to take power in their own hands, since ‘Museveni might have rigged elections but I think
God let him do it for reasons that remain with him.’ In a similar vein, one Acholi Pente-
costal pastor gave a sermon about leadership some time prior to the elections:
There is something about our nation: we have a spirit of rebellion. We have a really big
problem with authority! They say ‘let’s have buses’, you say, ‘no problem, we will walk to
work!’. We think we understand authority, but we do not know how to submit to authority.
The sermon’s allusion to the Walk to Work protests staged after the 2011 elections were
more than clear – clear also was how the theological emphasis on submission to authority
contributed to forming a narrative of stability and peace. At the end of the sermon, the
pastor insisted that Christians were facing a choice between God and the Devil. If the
Devil was unleashed, the teargas people had seen would seem like nothing. By condemning
unrest on the streets, and emphasising the idea of God as a ‘God of order’, the pastor con-
structed the political opposition as the Devil, and the election as a time for Christians to
choose submission over anarchy. In an interview, the pastor elaborated:
It’s wrong to use your pulpit for hooliganism. God is in control, he is not unaware. There is
no political leader who did not get there without God’s plan, whether rigging or what. God is
not unaware.
In contrast to such views, which posited earthly authority as having a divine source and
hence being unobjectionable, the second line of argumentation we encountered distin-
guished between two types of authority. As one Catholic priest described:
The question of where authority comes from depends on the kind of authority. Self-imposed
authority is not from God. Authority gained from the rigging of elections does not come from
God. When you use the gun from government, you can’t say it’s from God. Then you get
authority from the gun, from killing, from suppressing the people. Almost from the Devil.
A Pentecostal pastor similarly argued that while some leaders ‘gain authority through the
gun’, genuine authority from God ‘comes progressively, not just all at once.’ Those reli-
gious leaders who distinguished between authority given by God, and authority taken
by man, tended to also emphasise that like the Prophets of the Old Testament, religious
leaders are ordained to ‘speak truth to power’, that is, to reprimand those who abuse
their power to the detriment of those they lead.
In addition to distinctly different doctrinal views on political theology, the clerics we
interviewed also differed in their views on the extent to which spirits, demons and witch-
craft influenced Ugandan politics. Some of the interviewees saw politics as thoroughly
enchanted, to use Gifford’s term.41 One Pentecostal pastor for instance explained:
What I know very well is that the spirit of the demons can influence the elections. Because
most of the politicians are nominal Christians, they will ask for help from the demons. Most



































in fact do; they go to witchcraft in order to win. Most leaders are led by demons. Very few are
truly Christian.
The perceived moral and spiritual corruption of politicians impinged a serious responsi-
bility upon born-again believers, as another pastor explained:
A person can be taken up; a nation can be taken up, if God’s people don’t stand up in prayer
and spiritual warfare. If the people of God relax and don’t stand in the gap in prayers, our
leaders and the nation will be taken up by the Devil.
A few days prior to the elections, another pastor stated that nothing could be done to
change the outcome of the election, or the violence that would take place, because
crucial spiritual battles had already been lost weeks ago due to insufficient prayers. He
however encouraged his parishioners to continue fasting and praying, since God alone
could change Uganda. Such accounts do not make clear whether it is in fact other-
worldly forces, or peoples’ prayers, that influence political outcomes, yet what is clear is
that they encourage enchanted action over political mobilisation.
Echoing Schoffeleers, we could argue that such enchanted religion had a depoliticising
effect on the 2016 elections.42 However, we hold that such a conclusion would be prema-
ture, for two reasons: first of all, those clerics who expressed the belief that spirits were
influencing the elections, often also expressed very clearly articulated ‘secular’ political
arguments. The enchanted and the NGO-ised planes of religious and political argumenta-
tion and action do not necessarily cancel one another out. A pastor can pray for peace and
engage in spiritual battle with the forces of division in the morning, and give a radio talk
show on civic duties and democracy in the afternoon.
Secondly, while they may direct engagement away from formal political channels,
enchanted understandings of politics can also contribute to expanding the space for
public debate. Some of the claims we heard from religious leaders; that it was the spirits
of violence and confusion that were causing the irregularities and violence around the elec-
tions; that Museveni was so powerful because he was resorting to magic to remain in
power; or that he could not be toppled because he was anointed by God; clearly did not
contribute to the birth of the ideal Habermasian ‘rational-deliberative’ public. But as
Englund43 has argued, they did contribute to the creation of public culture, or what Gar-
diner44 terms a wild public which is marked by a multiplicity of different voices and
rationalities. As our examples have shown, whether multiple enchanted voices contribute
to entrenching state power, or to delimiting it, is not a straight-forward question.
In sum, we claim that enchanted religion played a significant but ambivalent role
during the 2016 elections. As Deacon has argued for Kenya, it is precisely the non-speci-
ficity of spiritual idioms, prayers and spiritual warfare that enables their use when other
kinds of public expressions are limited by a repressive political regime.45 Yet we also
argue that enchanted religious expression cannot be romanticised as a form of inchoate
resistance. While it can expand public debate, it can also be employed to clamp it
down, and hence to entrench the excesses of state power: in Uganda’s 2016 elections,
both tendencies were identifiable.
Exploring the diversity of religious leaders’ positions
In the final part of the article, we distinguish factors which we believe explain some of the
diversity of religious leaders’ political outlooks and actions in election-time Uganda. As we



































have argued above, belief systems affect the ways in which the world is perceived and acted
upon. But theological arguments can also be contrived post-fact, as justifications for actions
taken. Hence we suggest that it is necessary to look beyond proclamations of belief alone, to
what Burchardt et al.46 characterise as the pragmatic political calculus that belies religious
leaders’ actions in Uganda, and to acknowledge the impact of patronage, intimidation and
ethnicity on religious leaders’ decisions to lend or deny active support to the ruling regime.
The Ugandan state has established itself as a fountain of privileges for religious leaders –
a strategy rendered all the more effective after cutbacks of donor funding.47 Examples of
this can be drawn from across the religious spectrum. The Protestant Archbishop Ntagali’s
public congratulations to Museveni, which we discussed above, were made at the opening
of a bishop’s house at which the president donated cash to the church and pledged more.
In social media, Ntagali’s views were likened to the silence of the Catholic Archbishop of
Kampala, Lwanga, in the months prior to the elections. Many Ugandans believe that
Lwanga, often an outspoken government critic, was tamed by Museveni’s donation of
217,000 euros for the refurbishment of the Namugongo shrine prior to the Pope’s 2015
visit.48 Another blatant exposé of religious patronage was staged at the launch of
IRCU’s week of pre-election peace prayers at the National Mosque in Kampala. Museveni
showed up waving a land title of a mosque in Kampala that has been subject to dispute
among two rival Muslim groups, which he said the Muslims could have back as soon as
the largely political disputes between them were resolved. In response, the Mufti urged
the gathered crowd to ‘vote for those who support Islam’.
Religious vote-buying occurs also at local levels, as when local council and parliamen-
tary candidates hand out money and other contributions at religious events, in response to
which they are prayed for. Among the many stories we heard of attempts to bribe religious
leaders to speak for particular candidates, the most striking was one we heard from a
Catholic priest according to whom a representative of the NRM had attended a diocesan
priests’meeting prior to the elections, and allegedly handed out each of the approximately
60 priests in the diocese 640,000 UGX (approximately 190 USD). Allegedly, the NRM
representative said he had come to the Catholics himself, since unlike others, they had
not themselves run to State House. A lay leader of the Church of Uganda maintained
that it was difficult for their clergy to keep an independent political stand when they
were so poor. Indeed, religious leaders’ vulnerability to patronage-based political coercion
differs based on their access to alternative sources of income.
One of the high-ranking officials at a religious umbrella body whom we interviewed
stated that ‘while Idi Amin would use the gun to silence critics, Museveni uses money’.
But the heavy deployment of security officials around Uganda during the 2016 elections
bears witness to the state’s continued use of the gun and other intimidation, also within
Uganda’s religious arenas. Many of our interviewees believed that their sermons were lis-
tened to and that they would be reported to security officers if they were too unpleasantly
political. Some claimed to know that there were NRM cadres spying among them, and
acknowledged that they were very careful about speaking out about politics in the presence
of colleagues they did not know extremely well. Interviewed clerics suspected that being
too outspoken included could lead to them losing their operating licences or their tax
reductions, having their electricity cut off, or simply disappearing.
A further factor at play in moulding religious leaders’ political positions is ethnicity,
and the personal and collective experiences that arise from different groups’ relationships



































to the central state. This came out particularly clearly in our interviews with Pentecostal
pastors, who as a whole are seen as being particularly pro-NRM. This is a view also will-
ingly advanced by the government, as when the government-owned New Vision reported
of a gathering of 5000 Born-Again Pastors all pledging support to the incumbent president
prior to the elections. However, as many Acholi Pentecostal pastors told us, perceptions of
pastors from different parts of the country vary greatly, something they described as at
times creating tensions in national meetings of their churches’ leaders. Here again,
however, the picture is diverse: just as religious affiliation and political views do not
necessarily correlate, so also is the case for ethnicity. One Acholi pastor heavily criticised
those of his colleagues who advocated openly pro-opposition views, and elaborated:
Sometimes the reasons and motives [for protesting] are wrong. We the Acholi here, it is dif-
ficult for us to accept Museveni as the leader. But it was ordained like that.
On a national level, religious leaders’ political manoeuvers are also impacted by strategic
considerations of how best to reach desired ends. This was particularly emphasised by the
UJCC and IRCU, who argued that remaining diplomatic was a key to their ability to effect
change. Talking to political leaders in privacy, we were told, helps inhibit resistance and
denial, which is why the umbrella bodies ‘do a lot of work behind curtains that people
may never get to know about’. The pragmatic value of a silent and diplomatic approach
may of course be considerable, since confrontational clergy have often been openly con-
demned and sidelined by government. However, in light of the view that a public space is
needed in which ‘the communicative interaction necessary to subdue and tame the
destructive excesses of political power’49 can operate, the religious leaders’ argument
becomes untenable. In fact, we argue that in Uganda, remaining quiet so as to stay on
good terms with an autocrat has implied submission to autocracy.
Conclusion: paradoxes of religious political engagement in a hybrid regime
While some Ugandan religious leaders have actively lobbied for the incumbent regime, or
silently condoned its authoritarian practices, others have sought to expand public debate
by voicing popular concerns. During the 2016 elections, Uganda’s religious umbrella
bodies’ proclaimed efforts to contribute to democratisation were diluted by their cultiva-
tion of a peace narrative, which the state co-opted to serve its interest in maintaining the
status quo through repression of political opposition. By performing public debate that
remained vacuous and vague on numerous crucial issues, religious leaders have in fact par-
ticipated in the enactment of a façade of deliberative democracy during the 2016 elections,
in so doing subverting the political proper, and legitimising the autocratic tendencies of
the hybrid Ugandan state.
Acknowledging religion, in both its NGO-ised and enchanted forms, as an important
constituent of public culture, contributes to more nuanced understandings of election
dynamics in Eastern Africa. Our analysis suggests that if research is limited to only that
level of religious activity which secularised scholars can easily relate with due to its
NGO-ised familiarity, it risks missing the variety of ways in which people actually concep-
tualise and act upon formal politics and how religious experiences can coexist with ‘delib-
erative and critical reason’.50 Furthermore, we have emphasised that while religion can



































depoliticise; suppress public debate and undermine the political proper; it can also politi-
cise, contributing important additional voices to the wild public51 of the political proper.52
Although our analysis of the elections suggests that the overall impact of public religion
has been to entrench the authoritarian face of Museveni’s hybrid regime, religious idioms
that explain political power as an outcome of collaboration with malevolent spiritual
forces also provide a language for political critique in an environment where political
debate is highly constricted. Indeed, there are elements in Ugandan public religion that
may, under different political constellations, serve different ends to the ones they do
now. Whether religious leaders gear themselves to support transformation or stability,
and whether they succeed in pulling along their followers to do the same, will have impor-
tant impact on the tone of political transition once Museveni’s presidency eventually
comes to an end. That time, however, is not yet.
Most of those we spoke with prior to the elections, regardless of their political alle-
giances, believed Uganda was not yet ripe for change. Such sentiments were particularly
prevalent among research participants in northern Uganda, where many people have
opted to try and stay under the radar of the state, drawing what benefit they can from
a violently enforced peace and the trickles of development that Museveni has allowed
to reach the country’s peripheries. This sense of patient waiting was summed up by the
hymn with which an Acholi Catholic choir began their practice once the polling stations
had closed on the day of the elections:
Have we trials and temptations? Is there trouble anywhere? We should never be discouraged!
Take it to the Lord in prayer.
After 30 years of one-man-rule, many Ugandans feel they have no choice but to join their
religious leaders in prayer for a time when the trials and trouble of Museveni’s regime will
be replaced by something hopefully sweeter.
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